Elections do not operate in perfect compliance with the law. Instead, irregularities are routine and, to some extent, inevitable. The law of elections responds to this tension by recognizing that only some legal irregularities, under only some circumstances, have even the potential to invalidate an electoral process. One manifestation of this response involves variable standards of compliance. Doctrines implicated by these standards recognize that some election rules require only substantial compliance, rather than strict compliance, to be considered fulfilled. These compliance standards serve a vital role in election law regimes across the country. The basic operation of these standards is, moreover, intuitively sensible. Nevertheless, the case law surrounding these distinctions tends to be analytically tortuous. The convoluted nature of these precedents is due in part to the complexity and diversity of election law regimes across the country, in part to imprecision in how courts and litigants discuss these concepts, and in part to tensions between these compliance standards and the rise of textualism, which in recent decades has become the governing methodology for statutory interpretation. This Essay describes the need for these compliance standards in elections, a reality reflected in their long pedigree in the case law. It then explores how and why the doctrine surrounding these standards poses so many challenges. Finally, this Essay concludes by reiterating the need for these standards and offering suggestions for improvement.
