Presented by Willard Hurst as part of his course "Introduction to Modern American Legal History" at the University of Wisconsin Law School in 1978. Hurst discusses the grounds of social legitimacy of the decision-making power of a small number of businesses. Top managers controlled their subordinates by guarding knowledge, and stockholders supposedly acted as a check on management. Yet, the managers' control of knowledge worked to limit the ability of stockholders to oversee managers. The recognition of this problem resulted in legislation providing stockholders with more access to information and increased opportunities to check managers. Hurst continues his discussion of the ability of stockholders to check management's power. Hurst looks at the argument that society could trust corporation managers because of the structural characteristics of the enterprise. The size of the project requires technical skill and knowledge. The corporation will prevent irresponsible people from entering management, because they may jeopardize the working of the corporation. Additionally, corporations should not have any great body of decision-makers who do not have any check on their authority (constitutionalism in business). Finally, Hurst discusses the deepened commitment to anti-trust without defining goals of the legislation.
