The phrase "freedom of contract" carries philosophical, ideological, and symbolic baggage. Thus, when we contrast the idea of "freedom from contract," we at least hint at irony or paradox. It is hard to imagine much freedom from contract if we translate "contract" to mean all of the relationships of human existence. Most papers in this collection consider freedom from legally enforceable contracts. Parties have decided that they will rely on relational norms and sanctions rather than the law or the law has decided that the world will go around better if we turn some people away from courts who want to complain of a breach.
Do we need freedom from contract? Are scholars' papers about such a beastie "solutions in search of a problem?" Let me stress the question mark at the end of my title. It is at least worth some thought about whether there is a problem, what it is and how important it may be. It seems appropriate in a symposium at Wisconsin to look to the law in action. If we do this, we will find there is a great deal of freedom from legally enforceable contracts. Sometimes it is a good thing; sometimes it is not. However, once we leave the land of appellate opinions, it is not easy to draw firm conclusions. The necessary data are lacking, and getting the data would not be easy.
