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Do States Bargain Over Investor-State Dispute Settlement? Or, Toward Greater Collaboration in the Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties

Item

Title

Do States Bargain Over Investor-State Dispute Settlement? Or, Toward Greater Collaboration in the Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties

Date

2014

Volume

12

Bibliographic Citation

12 Santa Clara J. Int'l L. 277 (2014)

Abstract

In this Symposium Essay I argue that social scientists interested in the empirical study of law-related phenomena should take greater advantage of opportunities to collaborate with traditionally trained legal experts. Legal experts can play a critical role in improving the quality of social scientific understandings and operationalizations of law. The legal expert's role should be considered as substantial and important to the research enterprise, as it entails the verification that the social scientist's observations of law meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the theoretical concepts of interest. I illustrate my argument by reference to a recent empirical study by two political scientists that examines the extent to which states bargain over investor- state dispute settlement provisions in bilateral investment treaties.