In a developing country, nobody would propose unrestricted grants in aid from his country to a developed one. And yet, the practical effect of the present network of double taxation agreements between developed and developing countries is to shift substantial amounts of income tax revenues to which developing countries have a strong legitimate and equitable claim from their treasuries to those of developed countries. Concomitantly, these double taxation agreements result in a very considerable and unnecessary loss of badly needed foreign exchange reserves for developing countries. In other words, the present system of tax agreements creates the anomaly of aid in reverse from poor to rich countries. The reason for this anomaly is that the tax agreements currently in force generally give the country of a taxpayer's residence either the exclusive or more substantial right to tax income as against the country in which the income arose (the " source country ") and in income generating transactions between developed and developing countries the former is invariably the country of residence and the latter the country of source. The purpose of this article is to explain the origins of this anomalous system, to analyze the reasons for its perpetuation, and to discuss methods for eliminating or at least ameliorating it. Part I discusses how the present system originated and analyses the reasons for its continued vitality. Part 11 outlines proposals designed to infuse greater taxation at source in double taxation agreements between developed and developing countries.